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ABSTRACT 
This paper is concerned with the question whether or not retailers allow suppliers 
to set their prices not only on the basis of the costs faced by the suppliers but also on the 
basis of consumer demand, i.e., whether or not suppliers are able to use foresight (i.e., 
behave as vertical price leaders in the sense of Stackelberg leadership) by having the 
economic power and managerial ability to take into account the reactions of the 
downstream retailers to changes in suppliers' wholesale prices. Using standard theory, 
long-run price relationships between the stages in the channel are derived. Next, these 
static price relationships are imposed on a dynamic model to be tested for cointegration 
and error-correction structure. An empirical application to two Dutch marketing channels 
for food products gives conceivable results. 
KEYWORDS. Marketing channel, Price leadership, Time series, Cointegration, Vector 
error-correction model 
INTRODUCTION 
Most consumer food products are sold through independent retailers who sell a 
wide variety of substitutes. These companies are often larger than many suppliers, in 
Particular in agricultural food chains, and are gaining more and more influence on how 
and which goods are distributed and at what price (Choi, 1996). These observations 
suggest that suppliers are forced to set their prices largely on the basis of their costs and do 
not have the opportunity to set their prices also on the basis of consumer demand. 
On the other hand, in the marketing literature most channel studies have 
traditionally approached the problem from the supplier's perspective. Typical applications 
have been that retailers are passive decision makers and that manufacturers can influence 
their retailers' decisions through various incentives, pricing schedules, and cooperation 
(Choi, 1996). 
The objective of this paper is twofold. First, a model is developed to study strategic 
('•e-, long-run) pricing decisions within channels and to determine the profit maximising 
long-run relationships for the channel members in a single-supplier (on the wholesale 
'
evel), single-retailer channel dealing with a single product. Second, the long-run price 
relationships are examined in a dynamic (i.e., short-run) context to consider the possible 
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existence and nature of a long-run relationship between wholesale prices and retail prices. 
If a meaningful long-run price relationship is found, then it can be investigated whether or 
not wholesale prices and retail prices respond to changes in the magnitude by which these 
two prices are out of equilibrium. Based on the assumption that retail margins are mean-
reverting, two situations appear to be of interest: 1. both retail and wholesale prices 
respond to the equilibrium error, and 2. only the retail prices respond to the equilibrium 
error. In situation 1 the suppliers have sufficient power vis à vis the retailers to use 
foresight (the expression 'foresight is adopted from Lee and Staelin, 1997), i.e., to behave 
as vertical price leaders in the sense of Stackelberg leadership by taking into account the 
reactions of the downstream retailers to changes in their wholesale prices. In contrast, in 
situation 2 the retailers do not allow suppliers to influence retail prices beyond fluctuations 
in supplier's cost (including, among others, the prices of the raw materials and a margin 
enabling the supplier to continue its activities) and leave them only with the freedom to set 
their prices on the basis of their costs. Two empirical food product cases illustrate the 
procedure: coffee products and potato products. It is hypothesized that coffee tends to 
situation 1 while potato products better fit into situation 2. The empirical results provide 
evidence for these hypotheses. 
The paper is organised as follows. After the introduction, the formulation of the 
long-run model and its testable implications on the short-run price system are dealt with. 
Next, the empirical results are presented. The paper closes with a summary of the main 
conclusions. 
METHOD 
We consider the case of a two-member channel and model channel members' long-
run supply decision behaviour. A single upstream firm, called the supplier, produces an 
intermediate good at a constant unit cost (including the price of the raw materials), cs, and 
sells it to a single downstream firm, called the retailer, at a wholesale price/>5. The retailer 
faces constant unit retailing cost, cr, and resells the product to the consumer at a price pr-
it is assumed that the retailer does not throw away any of the intermediate good. 
Consequently, the quantity bought by the retailer, denoted by q, is equal to the final 
consumption. 
Static consumer demand behaviour is specified by a log-linear demand equation 
(cf. Von Ungem-Stemberg, 1994): 
Hqt) = Un(prt) + xt ( 5 < - l ) ( /=1 T), (1) 
where 5 is the price elasticity of demand and xt captures the shift in the demand curve at 
time t. 
Let us first consider the Stackelberg model in which the supplier is the vertical 
price leader, i.e., the retailer maximises its profit conditional on the wholesale price that it 
has to pay to the supplier and next, the supplier determines q, and hence, the wholesale 
price, by maximising its profit while taking the conditional profit-maximising behaviour 
of the retailer into account. 
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The conditional profit-maximisation problem of the retailer can be written as 
max (Prt-crt-Pst)qt 
(2) 
subject to (1). The first order condition for this problem is 
Prt + iàprtldqi) qt - crt -pst = 0 
(3) 
from which it follows that 
/>r, = [S/(l+ô)][/>5, + c r /]. 
(4) 
The supplier maximises its individual profit while taking the conditional profit-
maximising behaviour of the retailer into account (i.e., while using foresight) so that 
max (pst - csl) qt 
(5) 
It 
is subjected to (4) and has the following first-order condition 
Pst + (opstelt) <it - est = 0. 
(6) 
from which it follows that 
pst = -[(1 +8)/52] prt + cst-
(7) 
Notice that if the retailer does not take pst as given as was assumed in (3), then it can be 
derived that 
/Vr = [5/(l+o)][cr, + cs,], 
(8) 
which is the price being chosen if the retailer and the supplier determine qt by maximising 
total channel profits as if they were an integrated industry. 
We can solve (4) and (7) for;v/ andpst, giving 
/>r/ = [5/(l+S)]2[cr, + c5,] 
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and 
(10) 
Notice that because 5 < - 1 , comparing (8) with (9) shows that the retail price is 
lower in the case of the integrated industry and hence, qi will be larger and therefore, again 
because of the elastic consumer demand with respect to the retail price, the integrated 
industry makes more profit than the non-integrated industry. This is the well-known 
vertical externality due to 'double marginalisation'. See, for example, Tirole (1988: 174, 
175). 
In this study it is of interest to notice that if the prices are set according to (9) and 
(10), then the supplier has enough power vis-â-vis the retailer to use foresight in order to 
determine pst. However, if the retailer dominates, then we may have a situation as 
modelled by (8) in which case the retailer maximises profit and forces the supplier to set 
its price only on the basis of cSf. For simplicity, let 
Pst = est 
(ID 
in that situation. Thus, two models are considered: the model made up by (9) and (10), or 
similarly, (2) and (5), according to which the supplier is able to manipulate the retail price 
by dpsfldqt in (6), and the model formed by (8) and (11) which says that the retailer 
dominates, i.e., dpS{ldqt = 0 in (6). The testable implications of these models will now be 
discussed. 
Many economic time series, likepr/ andpS(, do not fluctuate around a constant in a 
seemingly random way, but their first differences, Apr( = pr( - pT,t-\ and ApS[ = pst ~ 
Psj-i, do (Granger and Newbold, 1986). Consequently, the variables in levels, pr{ and pst< 
are supposed to be nonstationary, while they will be stationary in first differences. In time 
series analysis this is expressed by saying that pr( and pS( are integrated of order one, 
denoted pri ~ 1(1) and pst ~ 7(1), and tspn and &pst are integrated of order zero, denoted 
Aprt-1(0) and Apst~ 1(0). 
The nonstationarity is caused by a so-called 'stochastic trend' (Banerjee et al., 
1993: 153), which can be interpreted as the driving force of the variable. If two variables 
are driven by the same stochastic trend, then a linear combination of the two will be 
stationary, which is expressed by saying that the two variables are 'cointegrated' (Engle 
and Granger, 1987). 
At first sight, there appear to be three variables in the model by which a stochastic 
trend could enter the price system: xt, cr( and cst. However, according to (8) - (11) the 
prices depend only on the cost variables crt and cst, but not on xt; qt fully captures xt in (D 
after prt is set by the pricing decisions of the channel members. Further, we may assume 
that crt d o e s not contain a stochastic trend of importance when compared with the 
stochastic trend generated by the prices of the raw materials being included in cst-
Consequently, we assume that cst introduces the stochastic trend in the price system. 
Because crt is assumed to be stationary while prt and pst are nonstationary due to 
cst, the long-run (i.e., cointegrating) relationship between prt &ndpst is given by (4). If the 
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supplier is not dominated by the retailer, i.e., (2) and (5) apply, then (7) shows that there is 
a linear combination of pr\ and pSf that captures the stochastic trend in csr. In contrast, if 
the retailer dominates, i.e., (8) and (11) apply, then (11) shows lhatpS( is the only one that 
captures the stochastic trend and is then substituted in (8) so that (8) reduces to (4), the 
cointegrating relation. To see why it is of interest to know which variables capture the 
stochastic trend, we have to introduce the concept of error-correction. 
The long-run equilibrium between prt and pSf can only exist if at least one of the 
prices responds to the equibrium errors in such a way that the equilibrium error will never 
become nonstationary (i.e., will always be mean-reverting). This is called error-correction 
(Engle and Granger, 1987). If both prt and pst capture the stochastic trend, then both 
prices will show error-correction. If just one of both prices, for example, pst, captures the 
stochastic trend, then only the other one, i.e., prt, will display error-correcting behaviour 
(Granger and Lin, 1995, and Gonzalo and Granger, 1995). This brings us to a testable 
hypothesis that discriminates between the two channel models. Given that prt is error-
correcting, we can test whether or not pS( responds to the equilibrium error. Under the null 
hypothesis pS( does not respond which complies with the dominating-retailer (vertical 
integration) model. If the null hypothesis is rejected in favour of the alternative hypothesis 
according to which pS( displays error-correcting behaviour, then we conclude that the 
supplier has some price-setting power vis-à-vis the retailer as described by the Stackelberg 
model, equations (1) - (7) and (9) and (10). 
The hypothesis on error-correcting behaviour can only be tested if a meaningful 
long-run relationship between prt and pst can be found. To perform the cointegration and 
error-correction tests, a dynamic model must be specified. For this purpose, let us consider 
the following bivariate vector autoregression (VAR): 
*.=l! . l n .*-<+ / / + <W)'+*" (,2) 
where Xt = \prt, pst]' are the prices, u = [ur, \is]' are the intercepts, Dt are centred seasonal 
dummies which sum to zero over a full year, e„...,eF are IIN2(0,A) and the values of X. 
k+\,...,X0 are fixed. The VAR in (11) can be reformulated into a vector error-correction 
(VECM) form: 
AX, = nr,_, +Y!J'.lrJAX'-j +n+<s>D,+E, . 03) 
where 
AY,=^-A'/.„n = Xlin,-/andr,=-X;.1.1n,. 
Notice that there can never be a relationship between a variable with a stochastic 
trend and a variable without a stochastic trend. So if AY, ~ 1(0) and Xt ~ 7(1) (and hence, 
y.\ - I(\))t then n will be a zero matrix except when a linear combination of the variables 
, n
 Xt is stationary, i.e., when pr\ and pst are cointegrated (or when one of the prices is 
stationary so that we should also test for the absence of each individual price in the 
eointegrating relation to justify our assumption that both prices are /(l)). Because this 
'near combination is unique, the rank of TI will be equal to one, i.e., rank(ri) = 1. Hence, 
^ ( I T ) = 0 if there is no cointegration and rank(ri) = 2 if A', ~ /(O). The Johansen 
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procedure (Johansen and Juselius, 1990, and Johansen, 1995) estimates (13); to test for 
cointegration, trace statistics are used to determine the rank of n , and (other) likelihood 
ratio (LR) statistics are used to test for the absence of each individual price in the long-run 
equilibrium in order to check whether both price series are 1(\). 
Clearly, the result of interest will be rank(IT) = 1. In this case n can be 
decomposed into 17 = aß' , where a = [a r, a 5 ] ' is the adjustment matrix and ß = [ßr, f>s]' is 
the cointegration matrix, and (13) can be rewritten in full as: 
.4P*. 
<t>r\\ 
0.11. 
'Du ' 
• 
Pl-u. 
+ ~*n' 
(14) 
where, for example, ƒ= 12 in the case of monthly data. The adjustment matrix can be used 
to test for the absence of error-correcting behaviour. If a$ = 0, then Apst does not respond 
to the equilibrium error $rPr,t-\ + PsP^j-i. i-c, does not display error-correcting behaviour, 
but Aprt does, because otherwise rank(fl) = 0 implying that there is no cointegration (in 
fact, cointegration implies error-correction and the other way round). This result is in 
favour of retailer dominance. If the retailer does not dominate, then both a 5 and ar are 
unequal to zero such that both prices are error-correcting. 
RESULTS 
Here, an empirical application of the procedure outlined in the previous section is 
presented. Two food products are considered at industry level: 1. potatoes and potato 
products (potatoes for short), and 2. processed coffee. In the case of potatoes there are no 
strong A-brands and there is not much room for suppliers to set their prices as if they were 
a monopolist. Coffee, however, has some strong A-brands, in particular Douwe Egberts 
with a market share of 73% (Heijbroek and Schoemaker, 1993: 35). Here, as part of their 
marketing strategy suppliers are able to manipulate prices in order to influence consumer 
demand. Consequently, if the suppliers have some power vis à vis the retailers, then this 
could be expected to be the case for coffee, but is less conceivable for potatoes. 
Our sample consists of monthly wholesale and consumer price indices (1990 = 
100) which are obtained from Statistics Netherlands. For potatoes data are used from 
January 1991 up to and including September 1997 (81 observations). The sample for 
coffee runs from January 1992 up to and including September 1997 (69 observations). 
Inflation can be ignored when compared to the stochastic trend movements in the prices. 
Hence, the price series were not deflated. 
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First, a general form of model (14) was specified in which no restrictions were 
imposed on the parameters of prj.\ and psj-\- After some model selection without 
allowing the intercept, prt_t and Pp,t-\ to be deleted from the equations, the variable 
Apr,/-u was kept in the price equations for potatoes and &ps,l-i was left in the price 
equations for coffee. Using these models, the Johansen procedure was applied to compute 
the trace statistics in order to determine the rank of n . Because the critical values of the 
trace test depend on the specification of the deterministic part of the VECM, we first had 
to decide whether or not the intercept is restricted to be only included in the cointegration 
equation. The graphs of the retail and wholesale prices of both potatoes and coffee showed 
an upward movement. Consequently, the intercept was not restricted. The trace statistics 
and their critical values are presented in Table 1. 
Table 1. Johansen cointegration test 
Potatoes 
rank(n) 
0 
1 
trace statistic 
15.90' 
3.01 
5% critical value 
15.41 
3.76 
Coffee 
rankd!) 
0 
1 
trace statistic 
30.02' 
2.44 
5% critical value' 
15.41 
3.76 
Critical values are obtained from Table 1 in Osterwald-Lenum 
(1992: 468) 
For both products the trace statistics in Table 1 show that rank(n) = 0 must be 
ejected, whereas rank(IT) = 1 cannot be rejected. These results indicate that the retail price 
^ d the wholesale price are cointegrated, at least, if their coefficients are significant. They 
are. 
The cointegrating relation for potatoes was found to be 
prpJ = 0.47 pSpj + 59.29 + êrpJ, 
.
CKPrp,i is the retail price of potatoes,/?.^/ is the wholesale price of potatoes and êrpt 
s
 the equilibrium error. The coefficient of the wholesale price has a positive sign. This 
0rnPlies with the theoretical model. From the estimated parameter values it can be 
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derived that a considerable part of the retail margin is absolute, at least, if it is true that the 
measurement units of the retail and wholesale prices are more or less the same. 
The cointegrating relation for coffee appeared to be 
prcj = 1.08 psct + 5.02 + êrc,t, 
(16) 
where prcj is the retail price of coffee, pscj is the wholesale price of coffee and êrcj is 
the equilibrium error. At the 2.5 percent level the coefficient of pscj is not significantly 
different from one and the intercept can be restricted to zero. From these results it can be 
derived that the retail margin tends to be a percentage markup over the wholesale price. 
To study the error-correcting behaviour, we now consider the parameter estimates 
in the VECM equations. 
For potatoes, the estimated model for the retail price 'is given by (/ statistics in 
parentheses) 
AAp rA/ = -0.11 - 0.20êr/,,,_, + 0.15 APr/>,/-i + 0.46 4pJjPi/_, + 0.45 Aprp>/.I2 + erp,t 
, (17) 
(-0.11) (-3.31) (1.38) (1.72) (4.73) 
r = 68; R2 = 0.36;«r = 5.74; DW = 2.02;prob. AR\-\ = 0.87;prob. ARl-4 = 0.88, 
and the estimated equation for the wholesale price was found to be 
AApv ,r= 0.16 + 0.01 èrpj.t + 0.03 APip,M + 0.19 àpsp,t-x + 0.07 APr^f-n + z$p,t 
, (18) 
(-0.11) (0.47) (0.47) (1.42) (1.49) 
7-= 68; R2 = 0.09;a = 2.85; DW= 1.94;prob. AR\-\ = 0.74;prob. ARl-4 = 0.40, 
where prop. ARl-i is the p-value of the F version of the LM statistic testing for the 
absence of rth-order autocorrelation in the estimated residuals. The coefficient of the error-
correction term, 
êrp.t-u is -0-20 and significant in (17), but is not significant in (18). Consequently, v«e 
conclude that the wholesale price does not display error-correcting behaviour and 
therefore, we reject the model in which the supplier is able to use foresight in favour of the 
model in which the retail market does not allow suppliers to control prices. 
For coffee, the estimated model for the retail price is given by 
A 
AprcJ= 0.21 - 0.38 êrc>/_, + 0.81 àpsc,., + zrcJ, (19) 
(0.53) (-2.41) (7.70) 
r = 69; R1 = 0.52;a = 3.19; DW= 2.1 \;prob. ,4*1-1= 0.54;prob. AR\-A = 0.60, 
and the estimated equation for the wholesale price was found to be 
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Apsc,t= 0.34 + 0.26 èrCit.t + 0.60 tq>scM + eSCtt, (20) 
(0.92) (1.76) (6.09) 
T= 69; R1 = 0.37;er = 3.01; DW= 2.00;prob. ARÏ-l = 0.99;prob. ARl-4 = 0.52. 
The error-correction term, èrcj_„ significantly enters both equations (19) and (20) 
when compared with the 5 percent critical value of the one-side / test. The estimated 
values of the parameters of erCf_, imply error-correcting behaviour of both prices. As a 
consequence, we conclude that the suppliers of coffee products have some influence in 
setting consumer prices to maximise their profits. 
CONCLUSION 
In this study the method of cointegration was applied to discriminate between two 
channel regimes. In the first regime the suppliers have enough power vis-â-vis the retailers 
to be involved in setting the consumer price. In the second regime the suppliers set their 
prices only on the basis of their costs (including those of raw materials) without being able 
to choose their prices on the basis of consumer demand. 
To investigate which regime applies, a test procedure was developed on the basis 
°f cointegration and error-correction analysis. The procedure can already be used if time-
series data on the wholesale price and the retail price of the product are available. 
In the empirical analysis the test procedure was applied to two food product groups 
'n the Dutch market: potato products and processed coffee. With respect to potato products 
we knew that suppliers had not been able to monopolize the market by an effective 
•marketing policy. In the case of coffee, however, there are some strong A-brands in the 
market allowing suppliers to choose prices that fit into their marketing strategy. 
The empirical results confirm our observations. In the case of potatoes it was found 
that in the long run wholesale prices are only based on suppliers' costs, while in the case 
°f coffee wholesale prices are also based on consumer demand. 
In this paper we limited our attention to a single-supplier, single-retailer channel 
baling with a single product. Extensions to more general models of channels with more 
than two stages and more than one agent per stage is clearly required for in order to obtain 
a
 more explicit understanding of pricing decisions in a marketing channel. 
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